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“‘I prefer not to say I’m Rohingya,’ he said, ‘because it is very 
dangerous here.’”1  These are the words of Kamal, a Rohingya Muslim 
man, who had to smuggle himself while relocating within his own 
                                                          
1. Timothy McLaughlin, ‘I Had No Options’: The Rohingya Man Who 
Smuggled Himself, ATLANTIC (Feb. 5, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ 
international/archive/2019/02/rohingya-man-smuggled-himself-myanmar/581806/. 
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country to escape the violence sweeping Rakhine State in Myanmar.2  
Kamal’s family once owned a successful business in Sittwe, the capital 
of Rakhine State.3  However, his family’s wealth could not deter the 
ensuing violence.4  The Rohingya were attacked indiscriminately, 
regardless of whether rich or poor.5  At the peak of their detestation for 
the Rohingya minority, Buddhist mobs destroyed the homes in Kamal’s 
village.6  Although Kamal escaped from his village, he is far from safe.  
To survive, Kamal must hide his Rohingya ethnicity and must “live[] 
in a cramped apartment with his aunt, uncle, and cousins; [additionally, 
Kamal] finds his day job at a company importing electronics 
unmotivating.”7  This may not seem like the most horrible life, but 
Kamal’s escape and survival were only possible through bribes and 
lies.8  However, Kamal’s story differs from the reality for most 
Rohingya who do not have the means to escape the violence. 
The Rohingya reside in Rakhine State, one of the poorest states in 
Myanmar.9  Therefore, unlike Kamal, most Rohingya cannot escape 
through bribes and lies.10  Consequently, “slaughter, rape and village 
burnings” forced many Rohingya to exercise their only option—fleeing 
the country.11  For example, in 2014, before many Rohingya left for the 
bordering country of Bangladesh, the Myanmar government’s violence 
and evictions drove many Rohingya to seek shelter in “a wasteland of 
camps” on their country’s western border.12  These camps have been 
                                                          
2. Id. 






9. Jason Motlagh, The Survivors of the Rohingya Genocide, ROLLING STONE 
(Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/rohingya-
genocide-myanmar-701354/. 
10. See id.; McLaughlin, supra note 1. 
11. See Hannah Beech, First Rohingya Are to Be Returned to Myanmar Killing 
Grounds, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/11/14/world/asia/rohingya-myanmar-repatriation.html. 
12. Jason Motlagh, Myanmar: Burma’s Rohingya Left to Die in Concentration 
Camps, TIME (June 17, 2014), http://time.com/2888864/rohingya-myanmar-burma-
camps-sittwe/. 
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described as “concentration camps,” nothing like the refugee camps 
they were meant to be.13  Many fled the country because of the 
conditions in these camps.  As of early 2019, over 700,000 Rohingya 
have fled Myanmar.14  In early 2017, an estimated one million 
Rohingya lived in Myanmar,15 meaning nearly three-quarters of the 
Rohingya have fled.  Yet, the international community has failed to 
respond to this humanitarian crisis.16 
The Rohingya prosecution in Myanmar demonstrates the flaws of 
modern international efforts to thwart human rights violations and the 
need for comprehensive solutions to overcome moral and political 
ideological differences. 
Accordingly, this Comment addresses the International Criminal 
Court’s (ICC) recent decision acknowledging that the court may 
exercise jurisdiction over the Rohingya crisis, allowing the Chief 
Prosecutor to proceed with a preliminary investigation into the 
Rohingya people’s deportation from Myanmar.  Part I of this Comment 
summarizes the Rohingya crisis and highlights the court’s reasoning in 
deciding to assert jurisdiction over the crime.  Part II applies the court’s 
main reasoning regarding trans-border jurisdiction to our modern 
understanding of state sovereignty and international law to showcase 
their compatibility.  Part III, however, considers how specific sections 
of the court’s argument—the possibility of expanding a future 
investigation’s scope—are incompatible with current international law.  
To further illustrate the potential impact of the court’s new precedent, 
Part IV applies the court’s reasoning to ongoing conflicts in Palestine 
and Syria.  Part V outlines the ICC’s alternatives to asserting 
jurisdiction, which would not have required the ICC to interpret its own 
                                                          
13. See, e.g., id. 
14. Rohingya Refugee Crisis, U.N. OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF 
HUMANITARIAN AFF., https://www.unocha.org/rohingya-refugee-crisis (last visited 
Nov. 20, 2019). 
15. Eleanor Albert & Andrew Chatzky, What Forces Are Fueling Myanmar’s 
Rohingya Crisis?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, https://www.cfr.org/ 
backgrounder/rohingya-crisis (last updated Dec. 5, 2018). 
16. See Genocide Against the Burmese Rohingya: Hearing Before the Comm. 
of Foreign Affairs, 115th Cong. 84 (2018) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Rep. 
Gerald E. Connolly) (“[O]ur failure to hold accountable those responsible for these 
heinous atrocities gives a green light to human rights abusers not just in Burma, but 
around the world. As Elie Wiesel said[,] ‘[H]uman suffering anywhere concerns men 
and women everywhere.’”). 
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jurisdictional power.  This Comment concludes that although the ICC’s 
decision to allow a preliminary investigation into the Rohingya 
people’s deportation is a groundbreaking assertion of authority from an 
international body, it is necessary for redefining trans-border 
jurisdiction to comprehensively address human rights violations. 
I. THE ROHINGYA CRISIS AND THE ICC’S RESPONSE 
A. Rohingya Crisis 
One of the most recent human rights violations is the mass forced 
deportation of the Rohingya people from Myanmar.17  The Rohingya 
people are a stateless Indo-Aryan ethnic group who primarily resided 
in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, near the southern border of Bangladesh.18  
The group is comprised of a Muslim majority and a Hindu minority.19  
The Rohingya are considered a stateless group and, thus, have been 
“marooned on an international border, unwanted by either side 
[Myanmar and Bangladesh], weary, traumatized, . . . their very origins 
in dispute.”20 
However, the minority Rohingya population’s clash with the 
Buddhist majority, which is supported by the historically pro-Buddhist-
government in Myanmar, is not a new occurrence.21  The two groups’ 
confrontation began during World War II; the Rohingya Muslims 
                                                          
17. Eli Meixler, ICC to Examine Myanmar’s Deportation of Rohingya Muslims, 
TIME (Sept. 19, 2018), http://time.com/5400224/myanmar-rohingya-deportations-icc-
preliminary-examination/. 
18. Albert & Chatzky, supra note 15; Shakeeb Asrar, Rohingya Crisis 
Explained in Maps, AL JAZEERA (Oct. 28, 2017), 
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2017/09/rohingya-crisis-explained-
maps-170910140906580.html. 
19. Susan Glazebrook, Special Issue Editor: Professor Campbell Mclachlan 
QC: The Refugee Convention in the 21st Century, 49 Victoria U. of Wellington L. 
Rev. [VUWLR] 479 n.13 (2018) (N.Z.). 
20. Jeffrey Gettleman, Fate of Stateless Rohingya Muslims Is in Antagonistic 
Hands, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/03/ 
world/asia/rohingya-myanmar-bangladesh-stateless.html. 
21. Krishnadev Calamur, The Misunderstood Roots of Burma’s Rohingya 
Crisis, ATLANTIC (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/ 
international/archive/2017/09/rohingyas-burma/540513/; INT’L CRISIS GRP., 
BUDDHISM AND STATE POWER IN MYANMAR (2017), https://www.crisisgroup.org/ 
asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/290-buddhism-and-state-power-myanmar. 
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supported the British forces, while the Buddhist majority allied itself 
with the Japanese, which caused constant conflict between the two 
groups.22  Since then, the Rohingya have been under systematic attacks 
involving “oppression, periodic mass expulsions[,] and denials of their 
identity.”23  These attacks also arise from a predominant view that 
Myanmar government officials share: the Rohingya people are illegal 
immigrants who arrived from the bordering state of Bangladesh.24  This 
is a prevalent view despite evidence that Rohingya have been present 
in Myanmar since 1799.25 
This view of the Rohingya has led to recent brutal attacks on the 
group, which have prompted some international condemnation.  In 
August 2017, the military cracked down on the Rohingya population, 
leading many of them to flee their homes.26  During this particular 
crackdown, the militants burned Rohingya villages, one after the other, 
intending to remove the Rohingya from the land.27  As of early 2019, 
such unprecedented attacks have led over 700,000 Rohingya to flee 
Myanmar into the neighboring country of Bangladesh.28  The United 
Nations (U.N.) classified these ongoing attacks on the Rohingya as 
“hallmarks of genocide.”29 
The Myanmar government’s general response has been to deny any 
wrongful intent and the occurrence of any alleged events.30  For 
                                                          
22. Jaayita Sarkar, How WWII Shaped the Crisis in Myanmar, WASH. POST 
(Mar. 10, 2019, 3:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/ 
2019/03/10/how-wwii-shaped-crisis-myanmar/. 
23. Nicholas Kristof, Myanmar’s Appalling Apartheid, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/29/opinion/kristof-myanmars-appalling-
apartheid.html. 
24. See id. 
25. Id. 
26. Reuters, ‘Hallmarks of Genocide’: ICC Prosecutor Seeks Justice for 
Rohingya, GUARDIAN (Apr. 10, 2018, 6:14 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
world/2018/apr/10/rohingya-crisis-icc-prosecutor-seeks-power-to-investigate-
crimes-against-humanity. 
27. Gettleman, supra note 20. 
28. John Quinley III, The Rohingya Diaspora Is Crucial to Achieving Justice, 
TIME (Feb. 14, 2019), http://time.com/5529321/rohingya-myanmar-genocide-fortify-
rights-diaspora/. 
29. Reuters, supra note 26. 
30. See, e.g., Hannah Beech & Saw Nang, Myanmar Rejects U.N. Findings: ‘No 
Ethnic Cleansing or Genocide in Our Country’, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2018), 
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example, the Myanmar government’s response to the claim that its 
military burned down Rohingya villages was that “the Rohingya burned 
down their own villages.”31  Additionally, the government downplayed 
the bulldozing of villages, stating that it was trying to facilitate the 
Rohingya’s return to Myanmar by making the land suitable for 
rebuilding.32  However, the government has acknowledged and excused 
the occurrence of some crackdowns,  claiming they were a response to 
“threats from . . . Rohingya insurgents who carried out fatal raids on 
Myanmar security posts on Aug[ust] 25[, 2017].”33 
International efforts to stop these human rights violations have 
mainly been limited to world leaders’ talks and speeches, without any 
formal initiatives to hold the perpetrators accountable.  Thus, there is 
merit to the U.N.’s belief that the international community has “buried 
its head in the sand”34 by failing to address Myanmar’s crimes. 
B. ICC’s Response 
The International Criminal Court’s decision to open an 
investigation into Myanmar’s crimes is potentially the most effective 
effort taken to secure justice and accountability for the Rohingya 
people. 
On July 1, 2002, the Rome Statute entered into force, establishing 
the ICC.35  The ICC aims to “participat[e] in a global fight to end 
impunity, . . . to hold those responsible accountable for their crimes 
[through international criminal justice,] and to help prevent these 
crimes from happening again.”36  Although other international justice 
systems exist, such as the International Court of Justice (the judicial 
branch of the United Nations), their interdependence with the United 
                                                          
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/14/world/asia/un-myanmar-rohingya-
genocide.html. 
31. Id.  
32. Id.  
33. Id. 
34. See id. (Adama Dieng, the United Nations special advisor on the prevention 
of genocide, asserted this claim). 
35. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
36. About, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/about (last visited Nov. 21, 
2019). 
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Nations predisposes them to bureaucratic gridlock.  Accordingly, the 
ICC was created to be the first truly permanent, impartial, and 
independent international criminal court.37  The United Nations created 
the court to address the shortcomings of modern international efforts, 
such as the “selective justice” of ad hoc tribunals and prevalence of 
uncooperative national authorities.38 
As of 2019, 122 countries are State Parties to the Rome Statute, 
having both ratified and signed the original law.39  By signing and 
ratifying the Rome Statute, these State Parties agreed to support the 
ICC’s efforts and goals.  However, the ICC members failed to refer 
Myanmar’s crimes to the court, which illustrated their apathy regarding 
the Rohingya crisis.  Through their inaction, the members forced the 
court to interpret and expand its jurisdictional authority. 
1. Chief Prosecutor’s Request 
The ICC is not the only international body that has failed to take 
effective formal action to resolve the humanitarian crisis in Myanmar.  
For example, the International Court of Justice has repeatedly failed to 
get referrals from members to litigate pressing disputes; however, even 
                                                          
37. See The ICC Will Continue Its Independent and Impartial Work, 
Undeterred, INT’L CRIM. CT. (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1406; see also Simone Halink, All Things 
Considered: How the International Court of Justice Delegated Its Fact-Assessment to 
the United Nations in the Armed Activities Case, 40 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol.14, 37 
(2008) (“An additional complication is that the parties to the Court are sovereign states 
that, when presenting evidence, focus on the political impact of their case just as much 
as on its judicial impact.”). 
38. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court - Overview, UNITED 
NATIONS, http://legal.un.org/icc/general/overview.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2019). 
Selective justice refers to the idea that although there may be many wrongdoers, the 
court only seeks prosecution for a select few, which some parties have used to argue 
the court is discriminating against them. Peter Tatchell, Selective Justice, GUARDIAN 
(Jan. 5, 2007, 6:10 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/ 
2007/jan/05/selectivejustice. 
39. The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states parties/pages/thestatespartiestotheromestatute.aspx (last 
visited Nov. 21, 2019). 
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in those few cases that are litigated and binding, member states simply 
veto the decision, hindering any potential resolution.40 
The ICC’s Chief Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, sought to redeem 
previous unsuccessful efforts and further the ICC’s goal to end 
impunity.  Thus, Bensouda began a new process to hold the Myanmar 
government responsible for its crimes against the Rohingya people.  
Specifically, on April 9, 2018, the Chief Prosecutor asked the ICC’s 
Pre-Trial Chamber I to assess whether the ICC had jurisdiction to 
investigate the crimes against humanity—particularly deportation—
occurring in Myanmar against the Rohingya minority.41 
2. Pre-Trial Chamber I Decision 
The Prosecutor’s request posed a difficult question for the court 
because the ICC, like many other international courts, has limited 
jurisdiction.42  The ICC’s jurisdiction is limited to addressing genocide, 
                                                          
40. SEC. COUNCIL REPORT, MONTHLY FORECAST: OVERVIEW 1-2 (2017),  
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/2017_01_forecast.pdf (discussing the United Nations Security 
Council’s historical deficiency in utilizing the International Court of Justice and the 
notable historical example where “[t]he US vetoed a draft resolution calling for full 
compliance with the ICJ judgment” regarding the Military and Paramilitary Activities 
in and against Nicaragua Case). But see Gambia Brings Genocide Case Against 
Myanmar: International Court of Justice to Address Atrocities Against Rohingya, 
HUM. RTS. WATCH (Nov. 11, 2019, 5:21 AM), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/11/11/gambia-brings-genocide-case-against-
myanmar# (on November 11, 2019, after the writing of this article, Gambia filed a 
case against Myanmar regarding the Rohingya crisis with the International Court of 
Justice). 
41. Application Under Regulation 46(3), Case No. ICC-RoC46(3)-01-18, 
Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction Under Article 19(3) of the Statute, 
¶ 1 (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/4af756/pdf/ [hereinafter 
Prosecutor’s Request]. The Pre-Trial Chamber consists of a panel of judges who make 
pre-trial determinations, such as whether an arrest warrant should be issued or whether 
there is sufficient evidence to proceed with a trial. Pre-Trial, INT’L CRIM. CT., 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/Pre-Trial.aspx (last visited Nov. 26, 2019).  
42. Terrence Chapman & Stephen Chaudoin, People Like the International 
Criminal Court – As Long As It Targets Other Problems in Other Countries, WASH. 
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aggression, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.43  In the 
Rohingya case, the Chief Prosecutor alleged the Myanmar government 
was responsible for forcible deportation, which is specifically identified 
as a crime against humanity under Article 7 of the Rome Statute.44 
However, the court faced several challenges in determining 
whether it could assert jurisdiction over the Rohingya conflict.  The 
court’s greatest challenge lay in satisfying one of the preconditions 
necessary to assert jurisdiction.  Specifically, to conclude that it has 
jurisdiction over a crime, the court must demonstrate any of the 
following: (1) the crime occurred inside a State Party’s territory, (2) a 
State Party national committed the crime,45 or (3) the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) referred the crime to the Chief Prosecutor.46  
Here, the court encountered a problem because the UNSC had not 
referred the deportation to the ICC.47  Moreover, a  State Party national 
had not committed the crime48 because Myanmar is not a State Party to 
the Rome Statute.49  Additionally, Myanmar’s non-Party status 
prevented the court from justifying its jurisdiction based on a strict 
territoriality basis.50  As a result, the court’s only option to justify its 
                                                          
43. Rome Statute, supra note 35, art. 5.  
44. Id. art. 7(1)(d).  
45. Id. art. 12(2). A State Party is a country that has both signed and ratified the 
Rome Statute, meaning it has accepted the jurisdiction and legal obligations of the 
ICC. See State Parties to the ICC, ABA-ICC PROJECT, https://www.aba-
icc.org/about-the-icc/states-parties-to-the-icc/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2019). 
46. Rome Statute, supra note 35, art. 13(b). See Geoff Curfman, ICC 
Jurisdiction and the Rohingya Crisis in Myanmar, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 9, 2018), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/50793/icc-jurisdiction-rohingya-crisis-myanmar/ 
(discussing the possible bases for the ICC’s exercise of jurisdiction over the Rohingya 
crisis).  
47. Curfman, supra note 46. 
48. Id. 
49. Antoni Slodkowski, Myanmar to ICC: Rohingya Jurisdiction Request 
‘Should Be Dismissed’, REUTERS (Aug. 9, 2018, 6:14 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya/myanmar-to-icc-rohingya-
jurisdiction-request-should-be-dismissed-idUSKBN1KU1NG (The office of 
government leader Aung San Suu Kyi pointed to Myanmar’s lack of state party status 
as a key reason Myanmar was not responding to the ICC Prosecutor’s request for 
jurisdiction.). 
50. Curfman, supra note 46. Territoriality simply refers to one of the 
preconditions to assert jurisdiction, which is that the court has jurisdiction over the 
crime because the crime occurred inside the territory/borders of a State Party. Am. 
9
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jurisdiction was to find that the crime of deportation somehow occurred 
inside a State Party’s territory. 
Once the court establishes jurisdiction, it must still meet separate 
conditions to exercise that authority to investigate the crime.  The court 
may only exercise jurisdiction under the following limited 
circumstances: (1) a State Party refers the crime to the court, (2) the 
UNSC refers the crime to the court, or (3) the Pre-Trial Chamber 
approves the Prosecutor’s request for an investigation.51  In this case, 
the Chief Prosecutor requested that the Pre-Trial Chamber I decide 
whether the court has jurisdiction to investigate the crime of deportation 
against the Rohingya—the first step in proceeding with a request to 
open a formal investigation. 
After nearly five months of consideration, the Pre-Trial Chamber 
reached a decision on September 6, 2018.52  The Pre-Trial Chamber 
concluded the ICC may exercise jurisdiction over the Rohingya crisis 
in Myanmar and authorized the Chief Prosecutor to consider examining 
the alleged crimes, mainly deportation.53 
In its decision, the Pre-Trial Chamber articulated “that the 
requirement of displacement across a border constitutes a specific 
element of the crime of deportation under article 7(1)(d) of the 
Statute.”54  Furthermore, the court noted that decisions regarding 
territoriality have been uncontroversial thus far because all elements of 
                                                          
Soc’y Int’l L., Jurisdictional, Preliminary, and Procedural Concerns, in BENCHBOOK 
ON INTERNATIONAL LAW§ II.A (Diane Marie Amann ed., 2014), 
https://www.asil.org/sites/default/files/benchbook/jurisdiction.pdf (discussing the 
different bases for asserting jurisdiction). In this Comment, strict territoriality means 
the conduct of the alleged crime occurred completely inside the territory.  
51. Rome Statute, supra note 35, art. 13, 14, 15(3)-(5). 
52. Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I Rules That the 
Court May Exercise Jurisdiction over the Alleged Deportation of the Rohingya People 
from Myanmar to Bangladesh (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1403. 
53. See Request Under Regulation 46(3) of the Regulations of the Court, Case 
No. ICC-RoC46(3)-01-18, Decision on the “Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on 
Jurisdiction Under Article 19(3) of the Statute,” ¶¶ 72-73, 78-88 (Sept. 6, 2018), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2018_04203.PDF [hereinafter The 
Decision]. It is important to note that the Pre-Trial Chamber I conditioned the exercise 
of jurisdiction on “the allegations [being] established to the required threshold.” Id. ¶ 
78. 
54. Id. ¶ 60. 
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the crime are usually committed inside a State Party’s territory.55  
However, the court clarified that under Article 12(2)(a) of the Rome 
Statute, only one element of the crime needs to occur inside a State 
Party’s territory, although the Statute does not expressly state that 
proposition.56  Thus, this modified territoriality argument under Article 
12(2)(a) generated controversy regarding the ICC’s decision to exercise 
jurisdiction over the Rohingya crisis. 
Considering this modification, the court noted that the crime of 
deportation against the Rohingya was not complete until the group was 
displaced across the border into Bangladesh.57  This meant that part of 
the crime, the crossing of a border, occurred inside Bangladesh—a 
country that had signed and ratified the Rome Statute.58  Therefore, part 
of the crime of deportation could qualify as having occurred within a 
State Party’s territory.  Consequently, the court determined it could 
meet one of the preconditions for asserting jurisdiction under Article 12 
of the Rome Statute, and all that remained was for the Pre-Trial 
Chamber to authorize the court’s exercise of jurisdiction by approving 
the Chief Prosecutor’s investigation.59  Based on the Chief Prosecutor’s 
arguments and its own findings, the Pre-Trial Chamber approved a 
preliminary investigation into the crime of deportation committed 
against the Rohingya people of Myanmar in accordance with the proper 
procedures and international principles.60 
In addition to extending its territorial jurisdiction, the court noted it 
might potentially expand the investigation’s scope depending on the 
Chief Prosecutor’s findings from the preliminary investigation.61  The 
                                                          
55. Id. ¶ 63. 
56. Id. ¶¶ 64-65. See Rome Statute, supra note 35, art. 12(2)(a). The Court came 
to this determination based on a “contextual interpretation” of the article. The 
Decision, supra note 53, ¶ 65.  
57. The Decision, supra note 53, ¶ 73.  
58. Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, on Opening a Preliminary 
Examination Concerning the Alleged Deportation of the Rohingya People from 
Myanmar to Bangladesh, INT’L CRIM. CT. (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=180918-otp-stat-Rohingya [hereinafter Statement of 
the Prosecutor].  
59. The Decision, supra note 53, ¶¶ 73, 79.  
60. Id. ¶¶ 80-88. 
61. Id.  ¶¶ 74-79. See Statement of the Prosecutor, supra note 58 (“My Office 
will further consider whether other crimes under article 7 of the Rome Statute may be 
11
Gomez: The International Criminal Court’s Decision on the Rohingya Crisi
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2020
Gomez camera ready (Do Not Delete) 1/15/2020  12:57 PM 
188 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50 
main rationale for allowing potential expansion was that “coercive acts” 
might have resulted in the Rohingya’s deportation from Myanmar.62 
The court, anticipating that its decision would spark controversy, 
noted that a similar expansive territorial jurisdiction approach has been 
widely accepted by many international and national systems.63  
Importantly, the court identified other treaties Myanmar is a party to 
that follow a jurisdictional approach similar to the one the ICC accepted 
in this case.64  Therefore, the court concluded its decision conformed to 
international legal norms.  Although the court’s arguments and 
conclusion are not baseless or false, they merit further discussion. 
II. THE DECISION’S COMPATIBILITY WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW  
AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY 
The ICC’s decision on the Rohingya crisis represented the court’s 
liberal construction of its jurisdictional power because no part of Article 
12(2)(a) of the Rome Statute specifies that only one element of the 
crime(s) needs to occur inside a State Party’s territory.65  However, the 
court reached this interpretation due to the “context of the relevant rules 
of international law and in the light of the object and purpose of the 
[Rome] Statute.”66  The court cited various sources to reconcile its 
decision with international law,67 including national sources that 
demonstrate how numerous countries exercise a similar trans-border 
jurisdiction.68  The court also cited international sources, like the 
Permanent Court of International Justice.69 
                                                          
applicable to the situation at hand, such as the crimes of persecution and other 
inhumane acts.”). 
62. The Decision, supra note 53, ¶¶ 61, 74-79. See Statement of the Prosecutor, 
supra note 58 (“[T]he preliminary examination may take into account a number of 
alleged coercive acts having resulted in the forced displacement of the Rohingya 
people, including deprivation of fundamental rights, killing, sexual violence, enforced 
disappearance, destruction, and looting.”).  
63. The Decision, supra note 53, ¶¶ 63, 66-68. 
64. Id. ¶ 67, 67 n.111.  
65. See Rome Statute, supra note 35, art. 12(2)(a). 
66. The Decision, supra note 53, ¶ 72. 
67. See id. ¶¶ 65-71 nn.106-118.  
68. Id. ¶¶ 67-68 nn.112-115. 
69. Id. ¶ 66 n.107. 
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A. Compatibility with National Law and State Sovereignty 
In reaching a decision, the court confronted the principle that “any 
tangible human rights enforcement mechanism must come from states’ 
own domestic legal system.”70  Although the court generally shows 
respect for state sovereignty by acting only when national authorities 
fail to address a situation,71 when “a state ignores — or itself carries 
out — human rights abuses, the principle of state sovereignty comes into 
conflict with any possibility for resolution.”72  Such conflict was 
manifest in the Rohingya crisis because Myanmar’s legal system failed 
to address the Rohingya’s plea for peace.73  To overcome this conflict 
and justify its assertion of jurisdiction, the court cited several national 
sources.74  In its decision, the court respected this principle of deference 
to national authorities by citing specific countries’ laws that resemble 
the court’s jurisdictional argument. 
For example, the court’s decision is compatible with Australia’s 
Criminal Code Act because the code states that “‘a person does not 
commit the offence unless: (a) the conduct constituting the alleged 
offence occurs: (i) wholly or partly in Australia.’”75  Additionally, the 
Czech Republic’s Criminal Code uses similar language, stating that it 
is irrelevant whether the act was intended to occur wholly or partly 
                                                          
70. Holly Brooke, State Sovereignty and Human Rights – Irreconcilable 
Tensions, MEDIUM (June 7, 2017), https://medium.com/@hollybrooke/state-
sovereignty-and-human-rights-irreconcilable-tensions-462d356ae063 (explaining 
what it means to respect state sovereignty). See The Decision, supra note 53, ¶¶ 63-
72.   
71. How the Court Works, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/how-
the-court-works (last visited Nov. 22, 2019) (“[The ICC] prosecutes cases only when 
States do not [because they] are unwilling or unable to do so genuinely.”). 
72. Brooke, supra note 70. 
73. See generally Maung Zarni & Alice Cowley, The Slow-Burning Genocide 
of Myanmar’s Rohingya, 23 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 683 (2014). “The lack of legal 
protection for non-citizens, together with the implementation of local policies and a 
dysfunctional judicial system, deemed to have failed even minimalist models of the 
rule of law, govern the lives of the Rohingya in North Rakhine State, rendering 
everyday activities illegal and thus allowing free-reign for extortion, abuse, impunity, 
and wide-spread human rights abuses.” Id. at 709. 
74. The Decision, supra note 53, ¶¶ 67-68 nn.112-115. 
75. Id. ¶ 66 n.109 (emphasis added) (quoting Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 
14.1, para. 2(a) (Austl.)). 
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abroad.76  Furthermore, Georgia’s Criminal Code expresses that “‘[a] 
crime shall be considered to have been committed in the territory of 
Georgia if it began, continued and terminated or ended in the territory 
of Georgia.’”77  The court cited such sources to show that its decision 
would not violate the principle of state sovereignty because nations, like 
those noted above, have criminal systems that follow a similar 
jurisdictional approach.  Citing these sources also showed that the 
single element argument was not a new approach, as many criminal 
systems only require that part of a crime be committed inside their 
territory.  This indicates the court’s arguments had some basis rooted in 
the laws of various nations. 
Although the court’s citation to nations’ laws was persuasive at 
best, the court also directly cited Myanmar’s laws to strengthen its 
justification.  The court noted Myanmar’s Penal Code, which articulates 
the following: 
[a]ny person liable, by any law in force in the Union of Burma [now 
known as Myanmar], to be tried for an offence committed beyond 
the limits of the Union of Burma, shall be [dealt] with according to 
the provisions of this Code for any act committed beyond the Union 
of Burma in the same manner as if such act had been committed 
within the Union of Burma.78 
Essentially, Myanmar’s laws allow it to exercise jurisdiction over 
crimes that only partially occurred within its territory and sometimes 
over crimes committed completely outside of its borders.  But, the court 
went further and cited Bangladesh’s law, the State Party involved in 
this action, and demonstrated that Bangladesh’s Penal Code contains 
similar language.79  Therefore, the court believed its underlying 
rationale was justified because both countries involved in the dispute 
                                                          
76. Id. (quoting Trestní zákon, Zákon č. [Criminal Code], 40/2009 Sb. (Czech)). 
77. Id. ¶ 66 n.108 (quoting article (4)(2) of the Georgia Criminal Code). 
78. Id. ¶ 67. Myanmar was formerly known as Burma. Who, What, Why: Should 
It Be Burma or Myanmar?, BBC NEWS MAG. (Dec. 2, 2011), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-16000467. 
79. The Decision, supra note 53, ¶ 68 (“Every person shall be liable to 
punishment under this Code and not otherwise for every act or omission contrary to 
the provisions thereof, of which he shall be guilty within Bangladesh.”). See id. ¶ 68 
nn.113-15.  
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have codified laws that allow them to encroach upon another nation’s 
sovereignty to investigate extra-territorial crimes.   
B. Compatibility with International Law 
Although some of the court’s cited international treaties do not 
expressly support its proposition,80 there are existing laws and 
principles that support its position.  For example, the Case of the S.S. 
“Lotus” (Lotus), decided by the Permanent Court of International 
Justice in 1927, includes a supporting principle.81  In Lotus, a French 
ship collided with a Turkish ship on the high seas; Turkish forces then 
arrested the captain of the Turkish ship and a Lieutenant (Demons) from 
the French ship.82  Protesting the arrest, the Lieutenant argued Turkey 
lacked jurisdiction to initiate criminal proceedings against him.83  
Consequently, the French and Turkish authorities agreed to ask the 
Permanent Court of International Justice to resolve the dispute.84  In 
Lotus, the court concluded Turkey had jurisdiction because in 
international criminal law the concept of territoriality is “not an 
absolute principle.”85  Lotus’s “impact as a source of foundational 
principles in various areas of international law has been lasting.”86  By 
citing to Lotus, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber suggests it is adopting this 
established principle.  Although Lotus’s status in international law is 
                                                          
80. Unlike the cited national sources, the international sources cited by the Court 
are ambiguous at best as to the partial territoriality reasoning that the Court concluded 
was valid. For example, most of its citations to treaties that Myanmar is a party to 
only deal with extradition of a party national and not the occurrence of the crime inside 
a territory. See id. ¶ 67 n.111.  
81. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 20 (Sept. 7) 
(holding that territoriality in criminal law “is not an absolute principle of international 
law”); The Decision, supra note 53, ¶ 66 n.107.  
82. Hugh Handeyside, Note, The Lotus Principle in ICJ Jurisprudence: Was the 
Ship Ever Afloat?, 29 MICH. J. INT’L L. 71, 73 (2007). 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 73-74 (“‘(1) Has Turkey . . . acted in conflict with the principles of 
international law - and if so, what principles - by instituting . . . criminal proceedings 
in pursuance of Turkish law against M. Demons . . .?’”) (quoting Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. 
(ser. A) No. 10, at 5).  
85. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 20. 
86. Handeyside, supra note 82, at 71. 
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notable, it is unclear whether citing to only one case is sufficiently 
persuasive. 
Moreover, the ICC also referred to international treaties that 
Myanmar is a party to that adopt a similar trans-border jurisdiction 
argument.  These cited treaties include the following: the International 
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, the 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism, and the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.87  These treaties require 
Myanmar “to take measures to establish its jurisdiction . . . in cases 
where the alleged offender is present in its territory, irrespective of the 
location of the commission of the alleged offence or the nationality of 
the alleged offender.”88  Thus, the court highlights that Myanmar denies 
the court’s jurisdiction, yet allows a similar jurisdictional enforcement 
under the noted treaties. 
III. THE SCOPE OF THE COURT’S DECISION 
Although the court’s reasoning regarding trans-border jurisdiction 
is compatible with international law and principles of state sovereignty, 
the second part of the court’s decision regarding the possible expansion 
of the investigative scope is questionable.  The court tried to broaden 
its decision’s scope by stating it could also exercise jurisdiction over 
crimes that might have led to the crime of deportation.89  These crimes 
involve both “coercive acts” and other crimes under Article 7 of the 
Rome Statute,90 which are crimes that may not possess the same trans-
border element as the crime of forcible deportation.  However, this is 
                                                          
87. The Decision, supra note 53, ¶ 67 n.111. 
88. Id. ¶ 67. 
89. Id. ¶¶ 60-61, 74-78. 
90. Rome Statute, supra note 35, art. 7(2)(d); The Decision, supra note 53, ¶ 61 
(explaining other coercive acts may include “deprivation of fundamental rights, 
killing, sexual violence, torture, enforced disappearance, destruction and looting”); id. 
¶¶ 74-78 (referring to the crime of persecution and other inhumane acts as the other 
crimes under Article 7 of the Rome Statute). See Statement of the Prosecutor, supra 
note 58 (stating the possibility of examining several alleged coercive acts and other 
crimes under Article 7 of the Rome Statute).  
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controversial because the underlying rationale of the ICC’s decision 
only justifies jurisdiction over trans-border crimes.91 
Essentially, trans-border crimes, such as deportation, could serve 
as a Trojan Horse,92 allowing the court to investigate a non-State Party 
for crimes beyond those that international law expressly allows it to 
exercise jurisdiction over.  Unlike in its deportation analysis, the court 
does not cite any international law sources to justify its Trojan Horse 
argument.93  Unlike how the court cited national codes to justify its 
expansive territorial jurisdiction approach, here, the court did not defer 
to the principle of state sovereignty, failing to cite any national sources 
that supported its argument.94 
In its conclusion, the court attempted to limit the application of its 
decision and reasoning by stating that at least one element of the crime 
must occur within a State Party’s territory to justify an investigation.  
The court noted that it may also have jurisdiction over the crime of 
persecution, which is a crime against humanity, because “an element or 
part of this crime (i.e. the cross-border transfer) takes place on the 
territory of a State Party.”95  Additionally, the court addressed another 
potential crime—”‘other inhumane acts’”—that it could have 
investigated under Article 7 of the Rome Statute.96  However, the court 
did not explain why it discussed potential jurisdiction for these crimes 
                                                          
91. See The Decision, supra note 53, ¶¶ 57-72. In this comment, trans-border 
crimes refers to crimes where at least one element of the crime involves the crossing 
of a border, as in the case of deportation. The Decision, supra note 53, ¶ 60. 
92. In this comment, the Trojan Horse analogy is meant to illustrate how the 
court, through its groundbreaking decision, may have an unintended and 
consequential impact beyond investigating the crime of deportation. Though not 
deceptive as the classic Trojan Horse of Greek canon, the ICC’s interpretation of its 
jurisdictional power goes far beyond what meets the eye. Editors of Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, Trojan Horse, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Trojan-horse (last visited Nov. 30, 2019) 
(explaining the Trojan Horse mythology).  
93. See The Decision, supra note 53, ¶¶ 65-77 nn.106-23. The court does not 
explain why it has the legal authority to investigate other crimes if its jurisdictional 
grounds are solely based on the trans-border nature of the alleged crime: deportation. 
See also id. ¶¶ 65-77.  
94. See id. ¶ 66 nn.108-09. 
95. Id. ¶ 76. 
96. Id. ¶ 77 (quoting Rome Statute, supra note 35, art. 7(1)(k)). 
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when the Chief Prosecutor did not allege them.97  The absence of an 
explanation is significant because the court believed the crimes share a 
similar element: the crossing of a border.98  It is possible that the Chief 
Prosecutor and the court decided to sideline these crimes because they 
do not provoke the same impactful image as deportation—the image of 
over 700,000 Rohingya crossing the border into another country.  
Ultimately, it was this mass deportation and not the other crimes that 
provoked the need for a humanitarian response, which likely influenced 
the court’s focus. 
IV. APPLYING THE ICC’S REASONING TO OTHER SCENARIOS 
Although the ICC’s decision may not seem groundbreaking in light 
of precedent like Lotus, the decision’s effects are far-reaching.  For 
example, two current situations, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the 
Syrian conflict, demonstrate the extensive potential reach of the ICC’s 
decision.  Both situations are similar because other international 
community efforts have failed to effectively address them.  Moreover, 
both conflicts share four key characteristics that are central to the ICC’s 
reasoning in its decision regarding the Rohingya crisis.  These shared 
characteristics include the following: (1) the affected party is a State 
Party to the Rome Statute or has accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction, (2) the 
crime(s) committed are crime(s) that the ICC has jurisdiction over, (3) 
at least one element of the crime(s) being committed within a State 
Party’s territory is being committed by a non-State Party, and (4) the 
crime contains a trans-border element or has a trans-border effect. 
A. Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 
The ICC’s decision regarding the Rohingya crisis may impact the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  The ICC has attempted to address the 
conflict before, but it was unsuccessful.  In April 2015, Palestine 
became a State Party to the Rome Statute, giving the ICC jurisdiction 
                                                          
97. See id. ¶¶ 74-79; Prosecutor’s Request, supra note 41.  
98. The Decision, supra note 53, ¶ 78. 
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to investigate “crimes committed in the territory since June 13, 2014.”99  
On the other hand, Israel has not ratified the Rome Statute.100 
In 2015, the ICC began a preliminary investigation into the 
“situation in Palestine.”101  However, preliminary investigations 
typically take years unless a State Party requests a formal investigation 
through referral.102  In 2015, Palestine did not request such an 
investigation, and thus no real progress was made.103  There was no 
referral, in part, because international donors pressured the Palestinian 
National Authority (PA), the interim self-government of the Gaza strip, 
to refrain from pursuing an investigation.104  In 2015, Israel withheld 
tax revenues that it typically collects for PA to pressure Palestine to not 
open an investigation and in retaliation for Palestine becoming a State 
Party to the Rome Statute.105  Additionally, since joining the ICC, both 
Israel and the United States have consistently threatened and pressured 
Palestine not to make any formal requests to the ICC106; thus, at the 
time, it was highly improbable that Palestine would refer the situation 
to the ICC.107 
However, in 2018, Palestine resisted these pressures and referred 
Israel’s crimes to the ICC.108  Among the issues Palestine wanted the 
court to investigate were land disputes and attacks on unarmed 
protestors.109  Israel responded to Palestine’s request by arguing the 
ICC lacked jurisdiction over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for two 
                                                          
99. Zena Tahhan, Palestine Submits ICC Referral to Open Probe into ‘Israel 
crimes’, AL JAZEERA (May 22, 2018), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/05/ 
palestine-submits-icc-referral-open-probe-israel-crimes-180522101121093.html. 
100. Id. 
101. Preliminary Examination: Palestine, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-
cpi.int/palestine (last visited Nov. 30, 2019). 
102. Tahhan, supra note 99. 
103. Id. 
104. Id.; Jennifer Williams, Israeli Officials Fear a Looming Disaster: The 
Collapse of the Palestinian Authority, VOX (Jan. 4, 2016, 8:00 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/2016/1/4/10690270/collapse-palestinian-authority (defining 
what the Palestinian National Authority is). 
105. Tahhan, supra note 99. 
106. Id. 
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reasons: (1) Palestine is not a recognized state, and (2) Israel has never 
accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction because it has never signed and ratified 
the Rome Statute.110  In response, the ICC issued a warning to Israel 
stating “that extensive destruction of property without military 
necessity and population transfers in an occupied territory constitute 
war crimes under the Rome Statute.”111  Again, Israel argued the ICC 
lacked jurisdiction to investigate the situation and further noted that 
Israel’s legal system conducts its own war crime investigations.112  
Thus, Israel contended that its own legal system makes it sovereign and 
shields it from ICC criminal investigations. 
On the other hand, the ICC’s position is that the court will not 
investigate or prosecute individuals unless national authorities cannot 
or will not take action to address the alleged crimes.113  Here, the court’s 
willingness to investigate Israel’s crimes indicates that Israel’s legal 
system is not properly addressing the issues Palestine is raising.  
However, as of 2019, despite Palestine’s referral and the Chief 
Prosecutor’s warning, the ICC has not opened any formal investigations 
against Israel.114 
However, with the court’s recent decision regarding the Rohingya 
crisis, the ICC may have new precedent to open a formal investigation 
into Israel’s war crimes in the disputed area of Gaza.  A formal 
investigation is possible because the Israeli-Palestinian conflict shares 
similar conditions with the Rohingya crisis that were key in justifying 
the decision. 
First, Palestine, the affected party, is a State Party to the Rome 
Statute, which means the ICC would have jurisdiction to investigate 
                                                          
110. Id. 
111. Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou 
Bensouda, Regarding the Situation in Palestine, INT’L CRIM. CT. (Oct. 17, 2018), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=181017-otp-stat-palestine. 
112. Id. 
113. How the Court Works, supra note 71. 
114. See Oliver Holmes, Palestinian Minister Delivers Israel ‘War Crimes’ 
Referral to ICC, GUARDIAN (May 22, 2018, 10:37 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/22/palestinian-minister-israel-war-
crimes-icc-referral; see also Situations Under Investigation, INT’L CRIM. CT., 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/situations.aspx (last visited Dec. 1, 2019) (the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict is not currently listed among the twelve situations under 
investigation). 
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crimes under any of the following conditions: (1) the crimes occurred 
inside Palestine’s territory, (2) the crimes are committed by Palestinian 
nationals, or (3) the crimes are referred to the court by the UNSC.  
However, like Myanmar, Israel, the accused party, is also a non-State 
Party because it has neither signed or ratified the Rome Statute nor 
accepted the ICC’s limited jurisdiction. 
Second, the ICC’s Chief Prosecutor classified Israel’s actions as 
war crimes.  Palestine also classified Israel’s actions as war crimes 
when it requested that the ICC open an investigation.115  Therefore, 
Israel’s alleged crimes fall under the court’s jurisdiction because Article 
5 of the Rome Statute identifies war crimes as one of the categories of 
crimes under the ICC’s investigative prerogative.116 
Third, the specific war crime that either Palestine or the Chief 
Prosecutor may allege is the willful killing of Palestinians.  Under 
Article 8(2)(a)(i) of the Rome Statute, willful killing constitutes a war 
crime and may fall under the ICC’s jurisdiction.117  This crime occurs 
inside the Gaza territory, which is recognized as part of the Palestinian 
National Authority.118  One specific instance of Israel’s alleged willful 
killing occurred on March 30, 2018, when Israel killed over 100 
Palestinian protestors in the Gaza Strip.119 
A critical question in determining if this new court precedent 
applies to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is whether this crime has some 
trans-border element or effect.  In the March 30th incident, the Israeli 
soldiers who shot the protestors were on the Israeli side of the Gaza-
Israel border and did not cross the border into the Gaza territory.120  
However, the deaths occurred inside the Gaza Strip, Palestine, a State 
Party’s territory.121  Therefore, the crime of willful killing committed 
by Israeli soldiers had an effect across the border, in Palestine.  
                                                          
115. Holmes, supra note 114. 
116. Rome Statute, supra note 35, art. 5(c). 
117. Id. art. 8(2)(a)(i). 
118. Palestinian Territories Profile, BBC NEWS (Apr. 8, 2019), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14630174. 
119. Tahhan, supra note 99. 
120. See David M. Halbfinger, Isabel Kershner & Declan Walsh, Israel Kills 
Dozens at Gaza Border as U.S. Embassy Opens in Jerusalem, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/14/world/middleeast/gaza-protests-
palestinians-us-embassy.html.  
121. See id.  
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Palestine may not be able to convince the court to open an investigation 
based on this incident alone; however, the Chief Prosecutor may be 
driven to request the Pre-Trial Chamber to authorize an investigation 
based on the escalating number of serious crimes Israel is committing 
in Palestine.122 
Another potential crime Israel is committing against Palestinians is 
deportation, which has a trans-border element.  Since the court has 
established precedent granting it jurisdiction over crimes with a trans-
border element, Israel’s crime of deportation could bolster the court’s 
argument for exercising jurisdiction.  The allegation is that “[s]ince the 
establishment of Israel in 1948, deportation has been used to expel 
Palestinians from their land, both individually and en masse”;123 this 
would form the core of the case against Israel. 
Israel is likely to reject this broader jurisdictional argument.  
However, the court’s new precedent would likely support exercising 
broader jurisdiction to investigate Israel’s crimes, including war crimes 
such as willful killing and deportation.  Nonetheless, the ICC may 
choose not to initiate an investigation because the magnitude of the 
people affected is low compared to the Rohingya crisis.124 
B. Syrian Conflict 
The Syrian conflict more closely resembles the Rohingya crisis.  
Due to the similarities, the Syrian conflict may fall under the ICC’s 
jurisdiction.  The Syrian conflict has been shaped by “poor governance, 
violence, and resulting waves of displacement [in the Middle East].”125  
The Syrian conflict encompasses a wide variety of disputes, including 
                                                          
122. Israel: Apparent War Crimes in Gaza, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 13, 2018, 
12:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/13/israel-apparent-war-crimes-gaza. 
See Marlise Simons & Alan Cowell, Palestinians Ask I.C.C. to Open Full Inquiry into 
Israel, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/22/ 
world/middleeast/palestinians-israel-gaza.html. 
123. Bahea Namoor, Palestinians Displaced by Force, AL JAZEERA: PALESTINE 
REMIX, https://interactive.aljazeera.com/aje/palestineremix/ deportees.html#/21 (last 
visited Dec.1, 2019).  
124. Compare Israel and Palestine: Events of 2018, HUM. RTS. WATCH, 
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/israel/palestine (last visited 
Dec. 1, 2019), with Rohingya Refugee Crisis, supra note 14. 
125. ELIZABETH FERRIS & KEMAL KIRIŞCI, THE CONSEQUENCES OF CHAOS: 
SYRIA’S HUMANITARIAN CRISIS AND THE FAILURE TO PROTECT 5 (2016).  
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a civil war, which the Syrian government legitimizes as a fight against 
terrorism.126  The Syrian conflict is attributable to “deep-seated political 
and economic factors endemic to the region and [to] specific actions 
taken by the Bashar al-Assad regime and various insurgent groups.”127 
Since the conflict began in 2011,128 the court has not been able to 
address the situation, partly because the UN’s procedures affected the 
court’s ability to tackle the conflict. 
Throughout the conflict, evidence of the regime’s indiscriminate 
approach to prosecuting the war has led to multiple attempts to build 
a case for war crimes. Evidence includes the use of chemical 
weapons, the detention and execution of many without trial, and the 
use of torture. There had previously been an attempt to refer the 
government to the ICC back in 2014, when more than 60 countries 
backed a UN Security Council resolution. However, it was vetoed by 
Russia and China, the former remaining a staunch ally of the Assad 
regime.129 
Since the international community’s failed attempts to provide 
justice for Syria, American and European courts have led the discussion 
of such atrocious crimes, in which Syrian lawyers and human rights 
activists succeeded.130  Moreover, a recent filing by human rights 
lawyers may lead to further successes in this movement to obtain 
justice.  The lawyers brought two lawsuits against Syria on behalf of 
                                                          
126. Daniel Corstange & Erin A. York, Sectarian Framing in the Syrian Civil 
War, 62 AM. J. POL. SCI. 441, 454 (2018).  
127. FERRIS & KIRIŞCI, supra note 125, at 109. 
128. Id. at 7.  
129. Edwin Wood, Syrian Refugees Seek Justice Against Assad Government in 
ICC, THE ORG. FOR WORLD PEACE (Mar. 27, 2019), http://theowp.org/syrian-
refugees-seek-justice-against-assad-government-in-icc/. 
130. Maryam Saleh, Syrian Refugees Use Precedent Set in Rohingya Case to 
Try to Bring Government Officials Before the International Criminal Court, 
INTERCEPT (Mar. 16, 2019, 4:57 AM), https://theintercept.com/2019/03/16/syria-
conflict-internation-criminal-court/ (“The biggest success so far has been in Germany, 
where authorities last month arrested a former high-ranking Syrian intelligence officer 
and two others who are accused of crimes against humanity for torturing detainees in 
Syrian prisons. Other cases remain pending in France, Sweden, and Spain. (Cadman 
and al-Bunni[, two lawyers,] have been involved with some of these cases.)”).  
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Syrian refugees in Jordan.131  Unsurprisingly, the lawyers rely on the 
recent precedent regarding the Rohingya crisis to urge the ICC to 
investigate alleged crimes committed by Syria.132  In their Article 15 
communications with the ICC, the two groups of lawyers alleged 
Syria’s violation of international law.133  However, Article 15 
communications are not enough to open an investigation against a 
government until “‘the prosecutor . . . compile[s] that information and 
decide[s] whether to take it to a judge and move forward with a 
preliminary investigation.’”134 
Perhaps the ICC could be a key arbiter for the Syrian people 
because regional organizations do not possess the tools necessary to 
adjudicate the dispute, and the UN may also prove ineffective.135  
Therefore, with the ICC’s recent Rohingya decision, the court may have 
jurisdiction to bring Bashar al-Assad’s regime and insurgent groups to 
justice.  Unlike the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Syrian conflict 
shares more characteristics with the Rohingya crisis, primarily the 
magnitude of people it has affected; this makes it a stronger case for the 
court to assert its jurisdiction over. 
As noted above, there are three preconditions for the court to assert 
jurisdiction.  First, one of the affected parties must be a Rome Statute 
signatory.  In the Syrian conflict, one of the affected countries is 
                                                          
131. Syria War: Lawyers Submit First War Crimes Cases Against Assad, BBC 
NEWS (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-47483714 
[hereinafter Syria War]. 
132. Id.  
133. Saleh, supra note 130. Article 15 communications are the means by which 
“any individual, group, or organization can send information on alleged or potential 
ICC crimes to the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the ICC.” How to File a 
Communication to the ICC-Prosecutor, COALITION FOR THE INT’L CRIM. CT., 
http://coalitionfortheicc.org/how-file-communication-icc-prosecutor (last visited 
Dec. 1, 2019). 
134. Saleh, supra note 130 (quoting Heidi Nichols Haddad, author of “The 
Hidden Hands of Justice: NGOs, Human Rights, and International Courts”).  
135. FERRIS & KIRIŞCI, supra note 125, at 112. See generally Shelby Black, 
Universal Jurisdiction and Syria: A Treaty Based Expansion of Universal Jurisdiction 
as a Solution to Impunity, 21 INT’L TRADE & BUS. L. REV. 177 (2018) (discussing the 
U.N.’s political differences and deadlock as a likely impediment to addressing the 
Syrian conflict). 
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Jordan,136 which is a State Party to the Rome Statute.137  On the other 
hand, the aggressor, Syria, has not accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction by 
either ratifying the Rome Statute or accepting its limited jurisdiction.138 
Second, the crime(s) committed must be crime(s) that the ICC has 
jurisdiction over.  Here, one of the crimes alleged is deportation, which 
as discussed above is a crime under the ICC’s jurisdiction as expressly 
stated in Article 7(1)(d) of the Rome Statute.139  Since 2011, the Syrian 
conflict has driven more than 5.6 million Syrians to flee their country 
into the neighboring countries of “Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan and 
beyond.”140  Jordan, in particular, has taken in over 655,000 Syrian 
refugees.141 
Third, at least one element of the crime(s) must be committed 
within a State Party’s territory.  Applying the court’s trans-border 
element analysis, Syrians crossing Syria’s southern border into Jordan 
means that part of the crime of deportation occurred inside a State 
Party’s territory: Jordan.  Therefore, the ICC may be able to exert 
jurisdiction over Syria’s war crime of deportation.  The ICC may have 
a stronger argument to investigate the Syrian conflict than it had for the 
Rohingya crisis because of the greater magnitude of people affected by 
the conflict.  In the Rohingya crisis, the Myanmar government forced 
over 700,000 Rohingya to flee, whereas Bashar al-Assad’s regime has 
forced over five million Syrian’s to flee Syria.142  Syrians have alleged 
the Assad regime committed other crimes, such as “the use of chemical 
weapons, indiscriminate bombings of civilian centers, and torture.”143  
However, these other crimes fall under the court’s Trojan Horse 
argument, which is incompatible with international law and principles 
of state sovereignty because these other crimes do not share a trans-
border element. 
                                                          
136. Syria War, supra note 131. 
137. Jordan, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states 
parties/asian states/Pages/jordan.aspx (last visited Dec. 1, 2019). 
138. Black, supra note 135, at 184. See The States Parties to the Rome Statute, 
supra note 39 (Syria is not listed as a State Party). 
139. Rome Statute, supra note 35, art. 7(1)(d). 
140. Syria Emergency, U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, 
https://www.unhcr.org/syria-emergency.html (last updated Apr. 19, 2019). 
141. Id. 
142. Saleh, supra note 130. 
143. Id. 
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Fourth, the crime must contain a trans-border element or have a 
trans-border effect.  The Syrian crisis has affected Jordan in several 
ways.  Most notably, Jordan’s acceptance of a sizeable number of 
Syrian refugees “put dramatic strains on Jordan’s financial and limited 
natural resources, including water.”144  The large displacement of 
Syrians into Jordan could place Jordan in economic jeopardy.  
Specifically, “hosting refugees who make up more than 10 percent of 
the population in a relatively small and resource-poor country . . . runs 
the risk of transforming Jordan from a ‘middle income’ to a ‘low 
income’ country.”145 
As of 2019, the Syrian conflict likely presents a stronger case for 
the ICC to exercise its jurisdiction over than the Rohingya crisis.  It is 
puzzling that the court failed to address the Syrian conflict before the 
Rohingya crisis given the stronger evidence and magnitude of the 
crimes.  If the ICC does not take any concrete action, “the prospect of 
a post-Assad state—or a period of transitional justice—is difficult to 
imagine.”146 
Given the length of investigations and lack of referrals, it may take 
some time to appreciate the potential far-reaching effect of the court’s 
precedent in its Rohingya decision on other humanitarian crises.  Both 
the Syrian and Israeli-Palestinian conflict can no longer go unaddressed 
without formal judicial proceedings.  Traditional reprimands like 
sanctions and moral outrage have failed to effectively resolve the 
conflicts.  Therefore, the ICC’s new precedent should signal to the 
international community that it must end political gridlock and 
intervene to end humanitarian crises.  However, if the international 
community fails to provide comprehensive solutions to address human 
rights, the ICC would still be the best forum for ensuring that human 
rights do not go unaddressed. 
V. THE COURT’S ALTERNATE CHOICES 
The court’s decision regarding the Rohingya people is a necessary 
precedent to tackle human rights violations.  However, the court 
reached its decision by broadly interpreting its jurisdictional reach 
                                                          
144. FERRIS & KIRIŞCI, supra note 125, at 50. 
145. Id. 
146. Saleh, supra note 130. 
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under the Rome Statute, which may not have been the best approach 
but was the most feasible option.  The court had at least two other 
choices to address its lack of express jurisdiction that would likely not 
have been as controversial. 
First, the court could have proposed an amendment to the Rome 
Statute.  Article 121 of the Rome Statue allows any State Party to 
propose an amendment.147  Adopting an amendment requires a two-
thirds majority vote.148  By pursuing the amendment process, the court 
could have avoided interpreting its own jurisdictional authority.  
Instead, the court chose to justify its position by citing national and 
international laws that support its argument.  An amendment to Article 
12(2)(a) of the Rome Statute could have expressly clarified that only 
one element of a crime must occur inside a State Party’s territory for 
the court to have jurisdiction over the claim.  This amendment would 
not have been problematic because the court gave ample evidence of 
national authorities using express language in their own laws to justify 
exercising similar trans-border jurisdiction. 
As of 2019, the language of Article 12(2)(a) states that the court 
can assert jurisdiction to investigate crimes over “[t]he State on the 
territory of which the conduct in question occurred.”149  A new 
amendment to Article 12 could have stated the court has jurisdiction 
over “[t]he State on the territory of which the entirety or part of the 
conduct in question occurred.”  However, the court would have needed 
to obtain the two-thirds majority vote required to adopt an amendment.  
Although it is an obstacle, obtaining a two-thirds majority vote is more 
plausible within the ICC than within another body like the U.N., where 
approximately eighty percent of resolutions are adopted through 
consensus.150 
However, if adopting an amendment was improbable, the court had 
a second option to strengthen its argument for trans-border jurisdiction.  
Instead of acting independently, the court could have asked the State 
Parties for a referral regarding the Rohingya crisis.  If Bangladesh, the 
                                                          
147. Rome Statute, supra note 35, art. 121(1). 
148. Id. art. 121(3). 
149. Id. art. 12(2)(a).  
150. How Decisions Are Made at the UN, UNITED NATIONS, 
https://outreach.un.org/mun/content/how-decisions-are-made-un (last visited Dec. 1, 
2019) (consensus means “all of the Member States agree to adopt a resolution without 
taking a vote”). 
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affected State Party, had made a referral, the court would have had a 
stronger argument for asserting jurisdiction.  One of the greatest 
drawbacks of the Rohingya crisis not being referred to the court is that 
the ICC could only address a fraction of the crimes alleged against 
Myanmar because of its ruling’s limited scope,151 specifically its focus 
on the need for a trans-border element.  A referral would have allowed 
the ICC to open a formal investigation.  Without a formal investigation, 
the court had to resort to opening a preliminary investigation, which 
may take years to conclude, “increas[ing] the chances that critical 
evidence will deteriorate or be lost entirely, reducing the possibility of 
effective prosecution.”152  Pursuing these alternatives for future 
investigations could give the court the individual support of State 
Parties and the credibility needed to fully prosecute crimes. 
These procedural alternatives are limited short-term solutions to 
bolster the ICC’s assertion of jurisdiction; however, to effectively 
address human rights violations, the international community must 
recognize that international judicial bodies, like the ICC, need broader 
jurisdictional authority. 
CONCLUSION 
Although there have been talks between Myanmar and Bangladesh, 
there is “no current guarantee of public safety.”153  As a result, “only 
11 percent of recently surveyed Rohingya refugees expressed a desire 
to return” to Myanmar.154  Myanmar claims that it would welcome back 
the refugees, but the reality is that the Rohingya people face a greater 
danger than the crime of deportation currently being investigated by the 
ICC—the Myanmar government’s annihilation of the Rohingya 
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population through ethnic cleansing and genocide.155  As a court of last 
resort,156 the ICC is currently the Rohingya’s only hope for justice. 
However, to make real progress in resolving humanitarian crises, 
the international community must take formal action.  In this regard, on 
September 16, 2018, the United States House of Representatives 
Committee on Foreign Affairs held a hearing to discuss the Genocide 
Against the Burmese Rohingya.157  In the hearing, some speakers 
showed support for the ICC’s efforts while others were more 
skeptical.158  For example, some speakers stated that “the ICC is not 
going to answer [the Rohingya crisis] but it’s going to put more world 
pressure [on Myanmar]. It’s sort of collective.  It’s why we need . . . 
Congress[,] . . . the U.N.[,] . . . [and] the ICC.”159  However, some 
believe that even these efforts may be unsuccessful because the 
President has “trashed the ICC,”160 thus destroying the possibility of 
international collaborative efforts.  To best address these humanitarian 
crises, any derogatory views regarding the ICC must be put aside.  
World leaders must recognize that the problem is not the ICC but the 
ineffective assistance of the international community, which has made 
the ICC the last resort for individuals whose human rights have been 
violated. 
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